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PROPOSED STATUTORY REFORM IN THE LAW OF
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE IN KENTUCKY
M. viN M. TrmOcR*
Any effort to clarify or reform a phase of the law should
be guided by a thorough study of the operation of the rules in
existence at the time the proposed reform is advanced. Such a
study has been attempted in the present article, both as to the
existing law in Kentucky and as to advances already effected
in other states. By surveying the development of the concept
of negligent homicide, and the operation of varying statutes
relating thereto in the different jurisdictions, a more intelligent
effort can be made toward drafting for this state a statute or
series of statutes which will embody sound legal principles and
properly conform to public opinion.
No attempt has been made in the pages that follow to deal
-with that type of negligent homicide which is characterized as
wanton or depraved, and for which a conviction of murder is
proper.' The law of murder, except insofar as the statute pro-
vides penalties therefor, may well continue to be regulated by
the common law until such time as a need is felt for statutory
revision. Such a need is not strongly apparent at the present
time.
However, in the field of manslaughter by negligence, the
law in Kentucky is replete with seeming contradictions, and
grossly out of harmony with the prevailing rules and concepts
obtaining in most of her sister states. Accordingly, this study
is submitted, embracing as it does a survey of common law back-
ground and present statutory regulation in representative juris-
dictions. Additional consideration is given to the supplementary
* LL. B., 1941, University of Kentucky. Atty., Wage and Hour
Division, 501 Medical Arts Building, Nashville, Tenn.
A short discussion of the law of negligent murder may be found
in a Note by the present writer, (1939) 28 Ky. L. J. 53.
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offense of negligent homicide which has been created by statute
in a number of states, either to extend criminal liability beyond
the bounds of involuntary manslaughter, or in order to facili-
tate convictions in cases where death has been caused by the
negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
I
Early commentators divided the crime of manslaughter into
two classes, voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary manslaughter
consisted in an intentional killing without malice, that is, one
resulting from heat and passion upon sufficient provocation.
Involuntary manslaughter, on the other hand, embraced two
concepts, not always clearly distinguishable. The first was that
an unintended homicide resulting from the doing of an unlaw-
ful act (not a dangerous felony) should be manslaughter. The
second and closely allied situation was that in which death un-
intentionally was caused by the doing of an act, lawful in itself,
without due caution and circumspection. Being thus disregard-
ful of the safety of others and causing death thereby was con-
sidered a sufficient basis on which to predicate liability for in-
voluntary manslaughter.
2
The classic example of manslaughter by failure to exercise
proper care is an hypothetical situation suggested by Kelyng, J.,
in reporting on Hull's Case.3 In Hull's Case a workman threw
a piece of timber from the second story of a building under
construction, and despite his warning for everyone to stand
clear, the timber struck and killed a man. The homicide was
held to be misadventure, the workman having taken the usual
precaution in such a situation, but the judges agreed that had
the accident taken place in London where people are constantly
passing, it would have been manslaughter.
4
The frequently discussed case of James Rampton serves to
illustrate the views of early writers on this subject. The de-
fendant had found a soldier's pistol in the street and on reach-
24 Blackstone's Commentaries, 191; 1 East, Pleas of the Crown
(1803) 262; Foster, Crown Law (2d ed. 1791) 262-263.
'Kelyng, 40, 84 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1664).4Foster, in his Crown Law, preferred to put a limitation on the
view expressed by Kelyng. It was his opinion that if the incident
had taken place in early morning when few or no people were stir-
ring, and ordinary caution had been used, the death would properly
be misadventure. Id. at 263.
NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE
ing home he tried it with the rammer to see whether it was
loaded. The gun not appearing to be loaded, defendant pointed
it toward his wife and let fall the hammer whereupon the gun
discharged and defendant's wife was killed. He was convicted
of manslaughter.5 The propriety of the decision, however, has
been questioned; Foster said of it that "the law in these cases
doth not require the utmost caution that can be used," and it
was his opinion that the defendant had exercised the ordinary
and usual precautions in such a case.(
A somewhat similar situation was presented in a case be-
fore Judge Foster and a different result was reached. In this
t!ase the defendant and his wife went to visit a neighbor, the
defendant carrying his gun along. Before dinner he discharged
the gun and set it away. While defendant was away at churck
a friend loaded the gun and went hunting, but returned it to
the same place, still loaded, before defendant came from church.
Upon the latter's return home he took up the gun and in so
doing touched the trigger, causing it to fire and kill his wife.
Defendant was acquitted under direction by Judge Foster that
if defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that the gun was
not loaded he could not be guilty of manslaughter.
7
Despite the disapproval expressed by the early commen-
tators toward the decision in Rampton's Case, the same result
was reached two hundred years later in an almost identical case,
State v. Hardie." There the defendant, in sport to frighten a
neighbor woman, pointed an old revolver at her. The gun, which
had been found five years previously, which had been snapped
repeatedly, and which everyone considered as harmless, dis-
charged and the woman was killed. In affirming a conviction of
manslaughter the Iowa court said:
"Human life is not to be sported with by the use of firearms, even
though the person using them may have good reason to believe that
the weapon used is not loaded, or that being loaded it will do no
injury.'
In each of these three cases, it is clear that the homicide
was unintentional. Furthermore it is evident that the death
'Kelyng, 41, 84 Eng. Rep. 1073 (1664).
'Foster, op. cit. supra note 2, at 264. East concurs with Foster in
doubting the legality of the conviction in Rampton's Case. East,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 267.
7 Foster, op. cit. supra note 2, at 265.
'47 Iowa 647 (1878).
'Id. at 649-50.
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in each case was very much contrary to the desires and expec-
tations of the person causing it. Clearly the case arising before
Foster was correctly decided because there is no indication that
the defendant in that case was at all negligent. Having reason
to believe the gun unloaded and handling it in an ordinary
manner, he was behaving as the reasonable man would behave.
However, reasonable men do not point and snap even an un-
loaded gun at people without making absolutely certain of its
harmless condition. To do so is to follow a reckless course of
conduct which, if resulting in death, should make the actor
criminally liable, and that would seem to be the ground on which
the other two cases can be sustained.
Another early case, decided before Lord Chief Justice Hale,
helped to define the boundary between manslaughter and death
by misadventure. A carter had run over and killed a child in
the street. The court directed that if the driver had seen the
child but nevertheless drove upon it, he would be guilty of
murder; that if he was driving carelessly and thereby failed
to see the child it would be manslaughter; but that if the child
ran across the way and was run over before the carter could
stop, its death would be per infortunium.'o
One hundred and fifty years brought no ostensible change
in the law of involuntary manslaughter. In 1828 a carter again
was convicted of manslaughter for running over a child. The
court said that by being in the cart instead of at the horse's
head, the defendant was negligent; death having been caused
by such negligence, he was guilty of manslaughter.1 '
However, in 1830 the English court introduced the phrase
"gross want of care," supposedly as a prerequisite to criminal
liability based on negligence.' 2  Again, in 1836, in a prosecu-
tion for manslaughter the court observes: "The question here
is, whether you are satisfied that the prisoner was driving in
such a negligent manner that, by reason of his gross negligence,
he had lost command of his horses? '" 13 (italics added).
Although recent English cases involving manslaughter by
negligent driving are singularly rare, it may safely be assumed
"1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown (1778) 476.
'Knight's Case, 1 Lewin 168, 168 Eng. Rep. 1000 (1828).
"Ferguson's Case, 1 Lewin 182, 168 Eng. Rep. 1005 (1830).
"Rex v. Timmins, 7 Car. & P. 498, 173 Eng. Rep. 221, 222 (1836).
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that gross negligence is still required. 14 The clearest expression
of the position of the English court on this point comes from a
civil case, Tinline v. White Cross Ins. Ass'n, Ltd.,15 in which the
court states: "The crime of manslaughter in a case like this
consists in driving a motor car with gross or reckless negligence.
Ordinary negligence does not make a man liable for man-
slaughter. "16
Thus, although manslaughter by negligence remained, as
Blackstone defined it, the doing of an act lawful in itself "but
without due caution and circumspection," the requirement of
''gross want of care" or "gross negligence" had developed.
This requirement of something more than ordinary negligence
as a basis for criminal liability has been almost universally ac-
cepted today.17 Its acceptance has resulted in frequent lengthy
dissertations by judges and text writers concerning the "added
degree" and the nature of such negligence as gives rise to crim-
inal liability.'8
The overwhelming weight of modern American cases clearly
indicates that some equivalent of gross negligence or reckless-
ness is required for a conviction of manslaughter. 19 A good
illustrative case is that of Kimmel v. State,20 in which the de-
fendant had been convicted of manslaughter caused by reckless
driving. In reversing for insufficiency of the allegations, the
Indiana court said:
"Davis, The Development of Negligence as a Basis for Liability
in Criminal Homicide Cases (1938) 26 Ky. L.J. 209, 220.
(1921) 3 K.B. 327.
"Id. at 330.
CX Reg. v. Nicholls, 13 Cox C. C. 75 (1874); Reg. v. Elliott, 16
Cox C. C. 710 (1889); People v. Anderson, 310 Ill. 389, 141 N.E. 727
(1923); State v. Lester, 127 Minn. 282, 149 N.W. 297 (1914); People
v. Angelo, 246 N.Y. 451, 159 N.E. 394 (1927); May, Crim. Law (4th
ed. 1938) sec. 27; Davis, supra note 14, at 228.
" Hampton v. State, 50 Fla. 55, 39 So. 421 (1905); State v. Lester,
127 Minn. 282, 149 N. W. 297 (1914); Stehr v. State, 92 Neb. 755,
139 N. W. 676 (1913); 3 Stephen, Hist of Crim. Law of Eng. (1883) 11.
'Reckless driving: Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360
(1926); People v. Falkovitch, 280 Ill. 321, 117 N.E. 398 (1917); Kim-
mel v. State, 198 Ind. 444, 154 N.E. 16 (1926); State v. Thomlinson,
209 Iowa 555, 228 N. W. 80 (1929); Com. v. Guillemette, 243 Mass.
346, 137 N.E. 700 (1923). Firearms: People v. Buzan, 351 Ill. 610,
184 N. E. 890 (1933); Murphy v. Com., 15 Ky. L. Rep. 215 (1893); York
v. Com., 82 Ky. 360 (1884). Negligence of physician: Com. v. Pierce,
138 Mass. 165 (1884). See also Davis, supra note 14, who criticises
the rule as illogical, and advocates the application of the tort stand-
ard to cases involving dangerous instrumentalities.
0 198 Ind. 444, 154 N.E. 16 (1926).
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"And under the rules of common law it is only negligence in doing
such acts as will probably endanger life and limb which constitutes
that 'gross and culpable negligence' that amounts to an 'unlawful act'
within the definition . . . in all jurisdictions that adhere to the
common law definition of manslaughter, the affirmance of such judg-
ments (involuntary manslaughter by negligence) invariably has been
on the ground that the injury and death were shown to have re-
sulted from negligence in doing something obviously dangerous to
others which the defendant had attempted to do in wanton and reck-
less disregard of their safety."'
II
Typical of the statutes defining manslaughter by negligence
is th.at of New York, which provides:
"Such homicide is manslaughter in the second degree when com-
mitted without a design to effect death:
3. By any act, procurement or culpable negligence of any person,
which, according to the provisions of this article does not constitute
the crime of murder in the first or second degree, nor manslaughter
in the first degree. '
The punishment for this offense is imprisonment not to exceed
fifteen years or a fine up to $1000 or both.
2 3
Statutes almost identical with that of New York are to be
found in Minnesota,24 New Hampshire,2: North Dakota,20 and
South Dakota.27 California, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, and
Utah classify homicide by negligence as involuntary man-
slaughter if resulting "in the commission of a lawful act which
might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due
caution and circumspection. "28 An Arkansas statute provides
essentially the same definition: "If the killing be . . . in
the prosecution of a lawful act, done without due caution and
circumspection, it shall be manslaughter.' '29 Colorado, Georgia,
and Illinois in almost the same words define involuntary man-
slaughter as killing without intent "in the commission of an
unlawful act, or a lawful act, which probably might produce
Id. at 17.
1 Laws of New York (Thompson's, 1939), sec. 1052.
Id. at sec. 1053.
Minn. Stat. (Mason's, 1927), sec. 10078.
=2 N.H. Pub. Laws (1926), c. 392, sec. 9.
'Comp. Laws of N.D. (1913), sec. 9491.
-' 1 Comp. Laws of S.D. (1929), sec. 4024.
Cal. Penal Code (Deering's, 1937), sec. 192; 1 Idaho Code Ann.
(1932), sec. 17-1106; 5 Mont. Rev. Codes (1935), sec. 10959; N.M.
Stat.Ann. (Courtright's, 1929), sec. 35-305; Utah Rev. Stat. (1933),
sec. 103-28-5.
1I Dig. Stat. of Ark. (Pope's, 1937), c. 42, sec. 2982.
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such a consequence, in an unlawful manner. "30 Wisconsin has
the crime of manslaughter in the fourth degree which embraces
killing by gross negligence.3 1
Penalties for involuntary manslaughter, or manslaughter in
the second degree (which corresponds to involuntary man-
slaughter generally) range from imprisonment in the county
jail not exceeding one year in Colorado and Utah,32 to a pos-
sible fine of $10,000 and imprisonment for 30 years in Dela-
ware.3 3 In between these extremes are Kentucky and Georgia
punishing the offense simply with fine and imprisonment;34
Michigan, Minnesota, and New York may imprison not exceed-
ing fifteen years, or fine up to $1000, or both ;35 California and
Indiana imprison not exceeding ten years,36 while Wisconsin
for fourth degree manslaughter imposes a penalty of imprison-
ment for one to two years, or a jail sentence not exceeding one
year, or fine up to $1000, or both such fine and imprisonment.37
Probably the mean of the varying penalties is most nearly
approached in the statute of North Dakota which provides:
'Every person convicted of manslaughter in the second degree shall
be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than one
and not exceeding five years, or by imprisonment in the county jail
not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dol-
lars, or by both such fine and imprisonment. ' ,
" 2 Ann. Stat. of Colo. (Courtright's, 1928), sec. 1757; 6 Ann.
Code of Ga. (Park's, 1914), sec. 67; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1937), c. 38, sec.
363.
'Wis. Stat. (1939), sec. 340.26.
"2 Ann. Stat. of Colo. (Courtright's, 1928), sec. 1758; Utah Rev.
Stat. (1933), sec. 103-28-6.
"Rev. Code of Del. (1935), c. 149, sec. 5.
"6 Ann. Code of Ga. (Park's, 1914), sec. 69; Conner v. Com., 76
Ky. (13 Bush) 714, 720 (1878).
"Comp. Laws of Mich. (1929), sec. 16717; Minn. Stat. (Mason's,
1927), sec. 10086 (1 to 15 years); 1 Laws of N.Y. (Thompson's, 1939),
sec. 1053.
Michigan, like Delaware, neither defines nor grades manslaugh-
ter but punishes the common law offense known as such. The Mich-
igan Supreme Court adheres to the common law disitnction between
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, and in sustaining a convic-
tion of the latter offense it made this clarifying statement: "The claim
is that, while doing a lawful act in driving his automobile, he did it
in such a negligent manner that it amounted to gross negligence on
his part. This would clearly bring the case within the definition of
involuntary manslaughter." People v. Ryczek, 224 Mich. 106, 194
N.W. 609, 611 (1923).
"Cal. Penal Code (Deering's, 1937), sec. 193; 4 Ann. Ind. Stat.
(Burns, 1933), sec. 10-3405 (1 to 10 years).
"Wis. Stat. (1939), 340.27.
"Comp. Laws of N.D. (1913), sec. 9475.
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In addition to manslaughter by the "culpable negligence
of any person," the New York Legislature enacted in 1936 a
provision creating the offense of "criminal negligence in the
operation of a vehicle resulting in death," which is punishable
by imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or a fine
up to $1000, or both. The offense is described as follows:
"A person who operates or drives any vehicle of any kind in a reck-
less or culpably negligent manner, whereby a human being is killed,
is guilty of criminal negligence in the operation of a vehicle result-
ing in death."'"
While most states have statutes essentially embodying the
crime of manslaughter by negligence, 40 the second New York
statute set out above represents a comparatively recent trend
in the criminal law. In 1921 Michigan enacted the first legisla-
tion creating the separate offense of negligent homicide com-
mitted in the operation of a vehicle. The Michigan act, which
has been substantially copied by a number of other states, pro-
vides as follows:
"Section 1. Every person who, by the operation of any vehicle at an
immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent man-
ner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of another,
shall be guilty of the crime of negligent homicide and upon con-
viction shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one thousand
(1,000) dollars, or to undergo imprisonment in the state prison for
a period not exceeding five (5) years, or by both such fine and im-
prisonment in the discretion of the court."'
As has been already stated,4 2 involuntary manslaughter in
Michigan requires gross negligence, a term which the Michigan
court has said "means wantonness and disregard of the conse-
quences which may ensue, and indifference to the rights of others
that is equivalent to a criminal intent." 43 It can be seen, there-
fore, that the crime of negligent homicide created by Section
16743 supplements the crime of manslaughter and it has been
so held. In the case of People v. Campbell44 the court said:
"By the enactment of this statute, the Legislature of 1921 obviously
intended to create a lesser offense than involuntary manslaughter
or common law negligent homicide, where the negligent killing was
caused by the operation of a vehicle. To do this it eliminated as
necessary elements of the lesser offense negligence classed as wanton
1 Laws of New York (Thompson's, 1939), sec. 1053a.
SSee Notes (1936) 25 Ky. L. J. 70; (1936) 25 Ky. L. J. 78.
Comp. Laws of Mich. (1929), sec. 16743.
Supra note 35.
'People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N. W. 400, 407 (1914).
237 Mich. 424, 212 N. W. 97, 99 (1927).
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or willful. Included in these terms is gross negligence. So that, in
the enactment of the statute, there was expressly eliminated as ele-
ments of the crime all negligence of such character as to evidence
a criminal intent; and, as we have before pointed out, wanton or
willful or gross negligence was of that character. Therefore this
statute wds intended to apply only to cases where the negligence is
of a lesser degree than gross negligence."
In 1925 Vermont followed the example set by Michigan,
creating an unnamed offense punishable by five years impris-
onment, $2000 fine, or both, for death resulting from careless
or negligent operation of a motor vehicle.45 The word "reck-
less" found in the Michigan statute was not included.
Louisiana followed suit in 1930 by creating the statutory
crime of involuntary homicide punishable by imprisonment for
a term not to exceed five years.4 6 The Louisiana act, however,
requires that the operation of the vehicle causing death be in
a grossly negligent or grossly reckless manner before liability
arises.
According to the Louisiana court, the new crime of invol-
untary homicide "is nothing more nor less than involuntary
manslaughter, committed by the grossly negligent use or opera-
tion of a vehicle.'"c4 The court further clarifies its position in
a later case by saying:
"The act of 1930 provides, in effect, merely that involuntary man-
slaughter committed by the grossly negligent use or operation of a
vehicle shall be subject to a less severe penalty than that which is
prescribed for involuntary manslaughter committed otherwise, if the
district attorney charges the defendant-or the jury convicts him-
of involuntary homicide instead of manslaughter."'
Thus it appears that the offense embrace only cases which
are also covered by the definition of manslaughter, although
it is put in a class by itself.
49
California in 1935 added the crime of negligent homicide
as a part of the state Vehicle Code.50 Section 500 provides:
'When the death of any person ensues within one year as the proxi-
mate result of injuries caused by the driving of any vehicle in a
negligent manner or in the commission of an unlawful act not
amounting to a felony, the person so operating such vehicle shall
be guilty of negligent homicide, a felony, and upon conviction there-
of shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not
more than one year or in the State prison for not more than three
years.)
'Pub. Laws of Vt. (1933), sec. 5152.
"La. Crim. Code (Dart's, 1932), sec. 1047.
'1State v. Flattman, 172 La. 620, 135 So. 3, 6 (1931).
"State v. Williams, 173 La. 1061, 139 So. 481 (1932).
"State v. Porter, 176 La. 673, 146 So. 465, 467 (1933).
"Cal. Vehicle Code (Deering's, 1937), sec. 500.
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In People v. Warner,5 1 the California Court of Appeals
affirmed a conviction under this provision, holding that it is
not necessary to prove criminal negligence to establish the of-
fense of negligent homicide. The court found that the inten-
tion of the legislature in enacting section 500 of the Vehicle
Code was to define a crime different from that provided for in
the definition of manslaughter, and to cover a different class
of crimes than those within the purview of the Penal Code.
It then observed that the state need prove, in addition to the
jurisdictional facts of time and place, only that the defendant
was driving a motor vehicle in a negligent manner and that such
driving resulted in the death of another person.5 2
The motivating factors leading to creation of the offense
of negligent homicide are not always evident from the word-
ing of the statute. An excellent discussion of the purposes
attributed by the courts to the legislatures passing such stat-
utes is found in Mr. Riesenfeld's article Negligent Homicide-A
Study in Statutory Interpretation.5 3 In a number of jurisdic-
tions, as he points out, the new offense overlaps the crime of
manslaughter, and it would appear that in those states the pri-
mary purpose of the legislature in creating the new offense was
to obtain convictions that could not be obtained under the more
severe penalties imposed for manslaughter. 54 Those states in
which the negligent homicide is likewise manslaughter are
Louisiana, Nebraska, Wyoming, Canada, and apparently New
Hampshire and Vermont. In California and Michigan the neg-
ligent homicide statute operates to extend criminal liability to
situations where the manslaughter statute is inapplicable,
though there is some overlapping of the two crimes. In New
Jersey, one who causes death by heedless driving in wanton
disregard of the safety of others is guilty of a misdemeanor. 55
This statute seems to prevent such homicides from being man-
slaughter, though the latter offense was formerly held to in-
clude them. 56 Likewise, in Connecticut one who causes death
527 Cal. App. (2d) 190, 80 P. (2d) 737 (1938).
"Id. at 739.
(1936) 25 Calif. L. Rev. 1.
"Louisiana clearly falls into this category. Id. at 16 and 21.
1 Rev. Stat. of N.J. (1937), sec. 2-139-9.
'State v. Dugan, 84 N.J.L. 603, 89 Atl. 691 (1913), aff'd, 85
N. J. L. 730, 89 Atl. 1135 (1914); State v. Blaine, 5 N.J. Misc. R. 633,
137 Atl. 892 (1927), aff'd, 104 N. J. L. 325, 140 At. 566 (1928).
NEGLIGENT HomICIDE
by the grossly negligent operation of a motor vehicle commits
a special statutory offense rather than the crime of man-
slaughter,5 7 although, as in New Jersey, such homicide was man-
slaughter prior to the passage of the statute.58
III
No statutory provision is made in Kentucky with regard
to the crime of involuntary manslaughter. Section 1150 of the
Kentucky Statutes 9 fixes the punishment for voluntary man-
slaughter but does not define the offense. The only provision
relating to a felonious unintentional killing is Section 1151,
which is limited to wilfully striking, stabbing, thrusting, or
shooting. Involuntary manslaughter, as delineated by Black-
stone is left to be punished only by fine and imprisonment in
the county jail, the common law punishment for non-capital
offenses not regulated by statute.60
As a result, no doubt, of a feeling on the part of Kentucky
courts that many cases of unintentional homicide merited a
more severe penalty, the crime of voluntary manslaughter has
been expanded, without the aid of statutory definition, to in-
elude homicides produced through negligence. By a not unusual
process of judicial mental gymnastics the Kentucky Court of
Appeals has found that even though a person unintentionally
shot and killed another, he must be presumed to have intended
the consequences of his acts and therefore is guilty of voluntary
manslaughter.
An illustration may be found in the case of York v. Com-
monwealth,61 in which the defendant had been convicted of vol-
untary manslaughter and sentenced to five years imprisonment.
The evidence on which the conviction was affirmed indicated that
the defendant caused the death of the deceased by the reckless
and careless handling of a shotgun while assisting in an arrest.6 2
The court approved an instruction that if:
"2 Conn. Gen. Stat. (1930), sec. 6047.
uState v. Campbell, 82 Conn. 671, 74 Atl. 927 (1910).
Carroll's, 1936.
"See Conner v. Com., 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 714, 720 (1878). See
also instructions on involuntary manslaughter in Jones v. Com., 213
Ky. 356, 361, 281 S.W. 164, 167 (1926); Morris v. Com., 255 Ky. 276,
279, 73 S.W. (2d) 1, 2 (1934).
m82 Ky. 360 (1884).
"Id. at 365.
L. J.-2
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"the shooting and killing of Kirkpatrick was accidental and was done
by defendant in the recklessly careless use or handling of a loaded
deadly gun, then in his hands, they [the jury] should find him guilty
of manslaughter and fix his punishment at confinement in the pem-
tentiary for not less than two nor more than twenty-one years.""B
The court quoted from Wharton 64 a section containing the fol-
lowing: "But even where the business is perfectly legal, negli-
gence in the discharge of it, when producing homicide, is man-
slaughter." It appears, however, to have escaped the court
that such a homicide was involuntary manslaughter at common
law65 and that the defendant was convicted of voluntary man-
slaughter, the common law definition of which had not been
changed by the statute.66
Further illustration may be found in the case of Largent v.
Commonwealth,67 in which a conviction of voluntary man-
slaughter and sentence of five years imprisonment were upheld.
According to the evidence the defendant caused the death of
the deceased by "recklessly and wantonly" driving into and
colliding with another car. The court quoted from King v. Com-
monwealth6 s the following rule:
"It is well settled that if one operates an automobile upon the high-
way and recklessly, wantonly, and with gross carelessness strikes
and kills another, he is guilty of voluntary manslaughter [citing
Jones v. Com. ] This principle is based upon the theory that a man
intends the natural consequences of his act and that he is aware or
ought to be aware of what will result from the reckless or grossly
careless operation of an automobile, which becomes a dangerous
lId. at 366. The court in Spriggs v. Commonwealth, 113 Ky.
724, 68 S.W. 1087 (1902) disapproves of the York case, but on the
ground that the instruction there given did not contain the limiting
adjective "voluntary." It did not disapprove of the instruction as
improperly defining what the court conceived to be the crime of
voluntary manslaughter.
2 Wharton, American Criminal Law (6th ed. 1868), see. 1004.
4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 191; 2 Wharton, op. cit. supra
note 64, secs. 931-933.
" Gen. Stat. of Ky. (1881), c. 29, art. 4, sec. 1, now Ky. Stat.
(Carroll's, 1936) 1150.
York v. Commonwealth was criticised by Judge Du Relle in
Spriggs v. Commonwealth, 113 Ky. 724, 68 S. W. 1087 (1902), for fail-
ing to distinguish, in defining manslaughter, between voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter. It is evident, however, from a reading
of the opinion in York v. Commonwealth that the instruction there set
out had reference to the crime of voluntary manslaughter for which
the statute imposed a penalty of imprisonment for two to twenty-
one years.
"265 Ky. 598, 97 S.W. (2d) 538 (1936).
253 Ky. 775, 777, 70 S. W. (2d) 667, 668 (1934).
213 Ky. 356, 281 S.W. 164 (1926).
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instrumentality under such circumstances, although he actually has
no intention to kill.'
In addition there is another peculiarity in connection with
Kentucky's law on involuntary manslaughter. While the rule
as developed by common law limited criminal liability for neg-
ligent homicide to those cases in which the negligence was gross,
culpable, or reckless, it would appear that in some situations
ordinary lack of care is a sufficient basis in this state. In the
case of Jones v. Commonwealth7 ' the defendant was convicted
of manslaughter for having run over and killed a child with his
automobile. In reversing the judgment because of misconduct
of counsel, the court recommended, inter alia, an instruction
substantially as follows:
If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant carelessly
and negligently, and in the absence of such care as an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances, ran into
and killed the deceased, they should find him guilty of involuntary
manslaughter and fix his punishment at a fine in any sum, or im-
prisonment in the county jail for any period, or both.
An explanation for such an instruction in a case of this
kind is set out in an earlier Kentucky case, Held v. Common-
wealth.7 3 In affirming a conviction of involuntary manslaughter
based on the defendant's having negligently driven over and
killed a boy, the court said:
. . . there can be no doubt that under the decisions of this court,
carelessness or negligence or recklessness in the performance of a
lawful act, which results in the death of another, is always unlawful
and criminal if the agency employed was at the time and place of a
character that its negligent or reckless use was necessarily dangerous
to human life or limb or property; and this dangerous character of
the agency employed has been accepted in this state, in a long line
of decisions, as sufficient to render a reckless or negligent or care-
less use criminal, upon the theory, no doubt, that the want of ordi-
nary care in the use of such an instrumentality in the presence of
others or upon a crowded thoroughfare in a city, or where others
are naturally expected to be, is gross negligence, and it is quite
apparent that such a position is logically correct, for there are many
instrumentalities of death with reference to which a want of ordi-
nary care in proximity to others is carelessness of the grossest
kind.""
In other words, the court is saying that failure to use ordinary
care in driving on a city street amounts to gross negligence, for
" Largent v. Com., 265 Ky. 598, 604-5, 97 S.W. (2d) 538, 542
(1936).
u 213 Ky. 356, 281 S.W. 164 (1926).
Id. at 361-2, 281 S.W. at 167 (Instructions 1 and 3 combined).
- 183 Ky. 209, 208 S.W. 772 (1919).
"Id. at 213-14, 208 S.W. at 774.
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which criminal liability is imposed if death results. Despite the
logic conjured up by the court to sustain its position, it appears
that the Kentucky view is shared by only one or two other
states. 7
5
IV
Statutory reform along paths outlined in the preceding sec-
tions necessitates a determination of policy. Since the principal
source of prosecutions for unintentional homicides derives from
the operation of motor vehicles, special consideration needs to
be given such homicides. Is it desirable to create a criminal
offense to punish all who negligently cause death while driving,
or is it better that they be punished as at common law only if
their conduct was grossly and culpably negligent? Still other
factors require consideration, since homicides continue to re-
sult from negligent use of firearms, negligent prescription and
administration of medical treatment, and even negligent handling
of building materials.
In the first place, separate reference to unlawful act and
lawful act performed in a negligent or unlawful manner should
be discontinued. The unlawful act rule has been so pruned and
restricted that today little of it is left. Such pruning bears
articulate witness to the disfavor into which the rule has fallen
with the courts. Its first limitation resulted when the courts
began to require that the unlawful act be malum in se in order
to form the basis for a conviction of manslaughter in the ab-
sence of some other factor making the homicide such.70 The
second limitation is the now general requirement that the un-
lawful act must itself be the proximate cause of the death.7 7 It
is no longer sufficient that the act producing death concur in
point of time with an unlawful act malum in Se.78 The unlaw-
ful act must be proximately responsible for the death before
the rule is applicable.
The entire concept that a homicide should be manslaughter
if resulting from an unlawful act is subject to the same criti-
'Davis, supra note 14, at 228. See also Riesenfeld, supra note
53, at 31. But see Wilner, Unintentional Homicide in the Commission
of an Unlawful Act (1936) 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 811, 835.
" See Riesenfeld, supra note 53, at 24; Note (1939) N.Y.U. L. Q.
Rev. 290, 295.
People v. Townsend, 214 Mich. 267, 183 N. W. 177, 179 (1921).7 8Tennessee, Maine, and Texas are contra. See Riesenfeld, supra
note 53, at 26; Wilner, supra note 75, at 834.
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cism as the ancient felony murder doctrine. To paraphrase
somewhat Justice Holmes' observation on the latter:
If the object of the rule is to prevent accidents resulting in death,
it should make accidental killing manslaughter; while, if its object
is to prevent driving while drunk,' it would do better to treat
as a felon one drunken driver in every thousand by lot.M
The case of Voltre v. State8 l illustrates the fundamental
weakness of the unlawful act doctrine. There the defendant,
contrary to law, gave whiskey to a minor. The whiskey caused
her to suffer a heart attack from which she died. The Indiana
court reversed a conviction of manslaughter, stating that for
a conviction the homicide must follow, both as a concomitant of
the commission of an unlawful act, and as a natural and prob-
able consequence thereof. It can be seen that the application
of this test obviates any consideration of the lawfulness or un-
lawfulness of the defendant's acts. By making liability for man-
slaughter dependent upon whether death was foreseeable, the
court escapes the possibility of such criticism as was voiced by
Holmes to the felony murder doctrine.
In order to forestall possible future disputation over de-.
grees of negligence and degrees of care, the words "negligence"
and "gross negligence" will be omitted from the statute. When
jurors learn from the hand of the judge that negligence is con-
duct producing an undesirable but unintended result, that gross
negligence is merely a higher degree of the same thing, but that
this higher degree makes a person guilty of voluntary man-
slaughter because he is held to have intended the natural and
probable consequences of his acts, they are likely to wonder at
this legal hoi-polloi. Then when it is learned that negligence
is lack of ordinary care, and is not sufficient for criminal lia-
bility, but that lack of ordinary care with an automobile on a
city street is gross negligence for which criminal liability is
imposed, the juror must indeed marvel at such labyrinthine pro-
fundity and he no doubt concludes that any result reached under
such a rule can be justified. By the judge's own instructions,
lack of ordinary care in driving down Main Street is gross care-
lessness for which the driver is held to have intended all natural
" or driving in excess of the speed limit, or giving a child excess
quantities of liquor, or throwing a child into the water to swim or
sink (or any other unlawful act malum in se).JHolmes, The Common Law (1881) 57-59.
1192 Ind. 684, 138 N.E. 257 (1923).
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and probable consequences. If a death is caused thereby, it
must be treated as intentional. If in addition there is evidence
requiring an instruction on murder, the jury learns that an un-
justifiable intentional killing, not accompanied by alleviating
circumstances of provocation and hot blood, is classed as mur-
der. Then the conscientious juror might well find himself in a
serious quandary. Taking all the instructions together, instruc-
tions based upon opinions handed down by the Kentucky Court
of Appeals, if he concludes that the defendant merely failed
to exercise ordinary care in his driving, thereby causing a death,
the juror might find the defendant guilty of murder.
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It is the opinion of the writer that the phrase "gross neg-
ligence" can be eliminated altogether and one less conducive
to confusion and loose thinking be substituted in its place. The
need for such a substitute is very ably met by "reckless disre-
gard," a phrase to which no seriously objectionable concepts
have attached. "Reckless disregard," widely used in this con-
nection already, aptly describes that "something more than or-
dinary negligence" which "imports" a "heedless indifference"
to the rights and safety of others.8
While it will remain impossible for the courts to pass to
the jury a measuring cup with which to evaluate the conduct of
the party on trial, it will be no more difficult than formerly to
explain that reckless disregard is such negligence as consti-
tutes a crime against the state; that it means negligence
"of a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of
human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous
effects, or. . . that entire want of care which would raise the
presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which
shows . . .' recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard of the
safety and welfare of the public, or that reckless indifference to
the rights of others which is equivalent to an intentional violation
of them.""
'Though this reasoning may bear strong resemblance to that
of the March Hare in Carroll's Alice in Wonderland, it nevertheless
illustrates the mystifying nature of legal opinions in which the court
has recourse to such fictions as that of holding that a person must
have intended the natural and probable consequences of his acts.
' Quotations from State v. Rountree, 181 N. C. 535, 106 S. E. 669,
671 (1921).
I" The word "wantonness" is deleted from this quotation because,
in the writer's opinion, its use should be confined to those cases where
the negligence is so great as to show a "depraved mind" or a "heart
regardless of social duty;" in other words, where a conviction of
murder is in order. See Note (1939) 28 Ky. L. J. 53.
0 Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 306, 363 (1926).
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In view of the foregoing discussion, therefore, the follow-
ing statutory definition is proposed for Kentucky, a definition
which is simple and which preserves in general the common law
connotation of the crime:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without
malice. It is of two kinds:
1. Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
2. Involuntary-as an unintended proximate result of any act
performed in a manner evincing a reckless disregard for
human life and safety. Being recklessly disregardful shall
mean negligently creating a risk to others which a reason-
ably prudent man would consider substantially likely to
cause serious bodily injury. It shall not necessarily mean
an intentional creation of risk.
Penalties for the two grades of this offense, based on the study
found in Part II, will be as follows:
1. Whoever shall be guilty of voluntary manslaughter shall
be confined in the penitentiary not less than two nor more
than twenty-one years.
2. Any person found guilty of involuntary manslaughter shall
be confined in the penitentiary not less than one nor more
than fifteen years, or fined any sum not exceeding one thou-
sand dollars, or both such fine and imprisonment may be
imposed."
There remains the question of whether a need exists for a
special negligent homicide statute applicable only to homicides
caused by negligent operation of motor vehicles. Such a statute
was considered desirable in Louisiana "to facilitate convic-
tions" 8 8 though not to extend the scope of criminal homicides.
In fichigan and California its purpose was to extend criminal
liability to situations where a manslaughter conviction could
not be had.8 9 In these states the law was passed "to curb reck-
less, careless, and negligent driving which caused death, in cases
where the negligence was less than gross." 90  It is complemen-
tary to the crime of manslaughter, covering the field of merely
negligent acts causing death.91
"Unchanged from Ky. Stat. (Carroll's, 1936), see. 1150.
81The penalty here provided for involuntary manslaughter is
greater than that imposed under the existing law of Kentucky. How-
ever, the crime as herein defined will embrace many of the convic-
tions of voluntary manslaughter under the present law. The pro-
posed penalty is the same as that in Michigan and New York.
Supra note 35.
" Riesenfeld, supra note 53, at 16.
Oid. at 33.
"People v. McMurchy, 249 Mich. 147, 228 N. W. 723, 728 (1930).
11 Riesenfeld, supra note 53, at 11 and 33.
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Inasmuch as the Kentucky court has held that lack of ordi-
nary care in driving subjects the driver to liability for invol-
untary manslaughter, if he causes death thereby, a statute sim-
ilar to that of Michigan and California would be in line with
such holdings. And, since the proposed definition of involun-
tary manslaughter is intended to abrogate the rule of the Held
case,92 criminal liability based on failure to observe ordinary
care in driving will depend upon a complementary statute.
The statutes adopted by California and Michigan may be
taken as evidence of the need for an extension of criminal lia-
bility to homicides caused by less than "gross" negligence or
reckless disregard, where they result from negligent driving.
That a similar need is felt in Kentucky may be surmised from
the unusual and somewhat strained interpretation of the Ken-
tucky court that want of ordinary care in the operation of
vehicles constitutes gross negligence. Therefore it is proposed
that a statute be passed creating the crime of negligent homicide
which crime shall consist in causing death by the negligent driv-
ing of a motor vehicle.
Such a statute could be made to read as follows:
Section 1. When the death of any person ensues within one year
as the proximate result of injuries caused by the drivmng of any
motor vehicle in a negligent manner, the person so operating such
vehicle shall be guilty of the crime of negligent homicide. Upon
conviction thereof he shall be punished by imprisonment in the peni-
tentiary from one to two years, or by imprisonment in the county
jail not exceeding one year, or by a fine not exceeding one thousand
dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
Section 2. Provided that this act shall not repeal or affect the law
of manslaughter, and the Attorney for the Commonwealth may, in
his discretion, charge with manslaughter persons who cause death in
the negligent operation of any motor vehicle, and the crime of neg-
ligent homicide shall be deemed to be included within every such
charge of manslaughter, and shall be a responsible verdict under
the said charge, and if the person so charged be found not guilty of
manslaughter, a verdict of negligent homicide may be rendered by
the jury."
,183 Ky. 209, 208 S.W. 772 (1919), cited supra note 73.
"This definition, though not the penalty, differs from that in the
California statute in two particulars: 1. In omitting the phrase "or
in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony."
The reason for this omission is the same as that expressed supra in
connection with omission of the same clause from the definition of
involuntary manslaughter. 2. In limiting the class to motor vehicles
rather than to vehicles in general. Since the occasion for the spe-
cial statute is the increasing number of deaths being caused by the
negligent operation of motor vehicles, it is not considered desirable
that the statute be made to apply outside that field.
"Essentially the same as La. Crim. Code (Dart's 1932), sec. 1049.
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Section 2, providing that a conviction of negligent homicide
shall be a responsible verdict under an indictment for man-
slaughter, is inserted to relieve the Commonwealth's Attorney
of the burden of charging the defendant with two crimes, when
it is uncertain whether reckless disregard can be proved. It is
assumed, of course, that if the jury which is considering a man-
slaughter charge finds the defendant guilty of negligence
amounting to reckless disregard, it will convict him of man-
slaughter, but that if the negligence was less than reckless dis-
regard, the defendant will be convicted only of negligent
homicide.
It has been the purpose of this article to suggest a means
whereby the legislative assembly may reframe and clarify Ken-
tucky's law of homicide by negligence. In order that this phase
of the law may be as intelligible as possible to the trial courts
and to juries, some such simplification as has been proposed
must needs be adopted. The writer believes that the suggested
statutory reform has two important considerations in its favor:
First, it would put Kentucky in line with the more progressive
states, both with regard to the law of involuntary manslughter
and to that of homicide caused by negligent operation of a
motor vehicle. Second, it would simplify the definitions of the
negligent homicide offenses, thereby inducing better under-
standing of the law relating thereto.
